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In this paper we analyse the cognitive roots of the division of labour and relate it to 
the reduction of tacitness in the organisation and technology of a firm. We study the 
interaction between efforts of knowledge codification and problems of control in 
production from an evolutionary and complex systems perspective. By applying our 
framework to the emergence of white-collar work in the late 19
th century and the 
modern knowledge economy we assert that property rights and limits to codification 
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1  Introduction  
Marx linked labour displacing technical change to the capitalist mode of production, where the 
ownership of the means of production and the historical conditions of production are reflected 
in the organisation of production. He identified the manufacturing division of labour (Babbage 
principle) as a main instrument of power in the hands of capitalists leading to the deskilling of 
workers and the development of machinery embodying their knowledge. Numerous 
contributors to the labour process literature have pursued and affirmed Marx’s perspective. 
Braverman (1974) stressed the importance of the Babbage principle in relation to the rise of a 
white-collar working class. His study underscored the role "divide and rule" had in 
implementing the economic interests of capitalists and in deskilling and displacing clerical 
workers through the mechanisation of office work. Glenn and Feldberg (1979) came to a 
similar conclusion for the case of the introduction of early electronic computers in the modern 
office. In a recent paper Hecht (2001) has further corroborated this view by finding that labour 
displacing technical change was a persistent feature in the insurance industry in post-war USA. 
A number of studies on the rise of modern accounting have advanced the thesis that accounting 
controls established round the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, and the rise of large 
administrative machineries along with them, were not a consequence of economic or 
technological imperatives, but rather were rooted in struggles as managers attempted to control 
labour processes ( Hopper and  Armstrong, 1991;  Bhimani, 1993;  Bhimani 1994). Labour 
deskilling and displacement in the office is viewed as the outcome of a process of class struggle 
and of the aim of capitalists to construct a "governable person" (Miller and O'Leary, 1987). The 
question whether the labour displacement resulting from the application of the Babbage 
principle is the result of a process of searching for solutions to problems given by historical 
conditions or whether it is primarily an instrument of capitalists to gain power and control over 
workers has not found much consideration. In most studies it is posited that it is a principle 
inherent to power and thus also inherent to the social class which has control over the means of 
production. Furthermore, the limits of this process of appropriation are not analysed. Not all 
skills or knowledge are equally suited to being transformed into technological blueprints in 
such a way that enables the replacement of workers with machines. 
 
The deskilling argument put forward in the labour process literature can be interpreted as the 
result of a process of codification of knowledge and extraction of human capital that is, skills 
and tacit knowledge from workers.
1 The issue of tacitness of knowledge in production and 
codification has featured prominently in the evolutionary critique of Neoclassical theories of 
technical change. However, evolutionary economists have viewed codification, tacitness and 
appropriation mainly as an issue relevant for the competitive advantage of firms (e.g. Saviotti, 
1998) and have not tried to relate it to issues of control over the labour process. Evolutionary 
economists contend that if  firms are not able to appropriate their technological knowledge it 
will spill over to competitors, who will catch up and weaken their competitive position. In 
order to maintain their competitive advantage they must try to push forward their technological 
frontier faster than knowledge leaks. Only a few contributions have studied the process of 
codification (e.g. Hippel and Tyre, 1995; Cowan and Foray, 1997), and to the knowledge of the 
authors of this paper no work has addressed the issue of appropriability of knowledge and the 
distribution of knowledge between firms and workers in detail. This question is insofar of 
interest as its analysis sheds light on the inducement m echanisms fostering the effective 
extraction and recombination of organisational and technical knowledge.  
 
Cowan and Foray (1997) have emphasised that the codification of knowledge involves three 
distinct but related aspects: the creation of (mental and heuristic) models solving a given 
problem, the creation of languages enabling the description of the problem and solutions and 
the creation of messages describing the problem or solutions for it. From this they conclude that 
codification entails the creation of new knowledge.  Nelson and Winter (1982) refer to 
incentives in their discussion of the codification of knowledge, when they say that 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper we follow the definition of tacitness and codification given in Cowan, David and Foray  
(2000).     2 
 
“circumstances place a great premium on effective articulation, remarkable things c an 
sometimes be accomplished”, (p. 78). But eventually they remain on neutral grounds when they 
find that it is mostly a matter of cost (p.80). Cowan, David and Foray (2000) take up this stance 
and argue that very little knowledge is inherently tacit and impossible to codify and whether 
codification takes place or not is essentially a question of costs and benefits. However, a 
treatment of inducement mechanisms in firm level technical change that goes beyond the 
traditional cost argument is not advanced.  
 
In this paper we assert that problems of control creating imbalances in the production system 
act as important focusing devices in the process of codification and creation of new knowledge 
on the firm level. We analyse the interaction between efforts of knowledge codification and 
problems of control in production. We establish that control over production is increased in a 
modular design of the activities of a firm and that this is an outcome of problem decomposition 
and the search for new organisational and technological routines. The importance of activities 
coordinating the interaction of other activities increases. This does not necessarily favour the 
appropriation of knowledge by firms but may also increase the relative power of individuals 
who have acquired critical knowledge on how to mediate between elements of the firm. We 
show that this is reflected in the technological and organisational designs emerging out of this 
process. We advance a historical case study on the development and implementation of modern 
office work in the period between 1870 and 1930 in order to discuss our theory on an empirical 
level to this end. Final remarks and prospective considerations on the role of knowledge 
appropriation in the “knowledge economy” conclude our paper.  
 
 
2  The cognitive roots of the Babbage principle 
2.1  Technology and the organisation of the firm 
A central concept in evolutionary economics is the idea that technological search conceived as 
problem solving activity develops along trajectories predetermined by technological paradigms. 
These technological paradigms are models of solution for selected problems, are based on 
selected material technologies and have a powerful exclusion effect in the sense that they are 
cognitive focusing devices in terms of the possible directions of search and the perception of 
technological possibilities (Dosi, 1982, p. 152-3). On the other hand Nelson and Winter (1982) 
stressed that routines are the basis for any economic organisation. Routines are present in 
technological search and in the organisation of productive activity. They are the result of past 
learning efforts in the realm of a specific technological paradigm and constitute the 
organisational memory of a firm. As such they are embodied in and link activities with the aim 
of producing goods or processing information.  
 
The selection environment of the firm ulitimately shapes the resulting organisation of 
production by constraining the space of possible options of choice and behaviour. Factors 
external to the firm are therefore important to understanding its internal set up. Firms are 
embedded in a specific institutional environment (see Coriat and Dosi, 1998), which influences 
the regional or sectoral innovation system of a firm as well as the social norms determining 
consumer choices. Yet, the most important and pervasive factor is the dominant property rights 
regime. It affects the costs of a firm insofar as it influences the wage bargaining mechanism, 
but it also establishes the type of control that management has to exert over production. To this 
extent, property rights have a direct impact on the organisational and technological designs that 
will emerge from technological search.  
 
The systemic perspective we adopt to analyse the influence of property rights on the structure 
of a firm and the design of adopted technologies is similar to the one proposed by Potts (2000). 
We view production and organisation as linked elements (activities) that make up the structure 
of the firm. This structure provides (i) the competence to process inputs into outputs and (ii) the 
competence to make further connections. We will analyse this structure in order to better     3 
 
understand how appropriation from economic activity and technological search works and shed 
light on the principles underlying the Babbage “divide and rule” heuristic. 
 
2.1.1  Property rights in technological and organisational change 
 
Property rights are central institutional elements in any economy. They confer to the holder the 
right to select the use of an economic good. Their value lies in the pattern of resource 
management they promote. Of course, property rights are far from perfect. The costs of 
enforcement and the probability of alienability define their strength. Under capitalism, physical 
property and the pooling of capital into going concerns with limited liability are strong, while 
rights on intangible assets are much weaker. This makes the allocation of economic property 
rights an important ingredient in the shaping of the direction of technical and organisational 
change.  
 
First, the capitalists’ right to a reward for advanced capital requires the enforcement of 
operating routines on the level of the organisation and technology of a firm in order to assure a 
return for their investment. The task of the management of a firm is to coordinate and organize 
production activities on behalf of the owners. For this purpose it is necessary that management 
be able to identify deviations. Accounting systems and reporting systems deliver the 
information needed to detect deviations from the objective. Thus, property rights and 
entrepreneurial activity define the form of the effective organisation of the firm, as there is an 
incentive to implement organisational measures and favour technological designs that support 
control.  
 
The second influence property rights exert on technical and organisational change derives from 
the fact that property rights are not perfectly enforceable. Nonaka (1994) has devised a theory 
according to which organisational knowledge is created through a continuous dialogue between 
tacit and codified knowledge that gives rise to a virtuous spiral in which individuals codify and 
share their knowledge with other members of the organisation, acquire new tacit knowledge 
and share that again. Nonaka’s theory does not discuss the fact that the presence of tacit 
knowledge clearly implies a lack of control for the owners of a firm. Hence, there is an 
incentive to reduce the tacitness of production activities.   
 
2.1.2  The firm as a complex system: complementarity, complexity and technological 
paradigms 
The structure of a firm is a more or less complex network in which the products of one activity, 
such as physical (final or intermediate) goods or information, are the inputs of another. Some of 
the ties in this web can be very strong, while others may be weaker. Their strength can result 
from strict technical complementarities, which are static, but also from dynamic 
complementarities,  which capture learning spillovers, synergy effects and other mechanisms 
generating dynamically increasing returns.  
 
A useful metaphor for thinking about complex systems is Stuart Kauffman's NK model 
(Kauffman, 1993). The NK model is extremely simple, it presents a system with N elements, 
each of which can take one of x possible states, and  K dependence relations between these 
elements. The NK model can easily be thought to represent a production system with  N 
production activities. If an a ctivity is not linked to any other activity then we have the 
constellation of perfect separability, which is implicit in Neoclassical production functions. 
Under perfect separability each activity can be changed or even exchanged without 
compromising the w orking of the system, as the performance of other elements is not 
influenced. However, if an element is interdependent with other activities in the network, then 
its removal may affect the performance of the other activities. Centralised control is highest, 
when the network is separable, and lowest with complete interdependence.     4 
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
This can be visualised by means of a generalised NK representation ( Altenberg, 1997) 
presented in figure 1, with N (activities) = 3 and K (output characteristics) = 3. The technical 
characteristics capture the production side of a firm and its link to science and technology. The 
service characteristics instead capture the link of the firm to the external environment and 
especially its demand,  as products are bought for the services they deliver ( Saviotti and 
Metcalfe, 1984,  Saviotti, 1996, pp. 63,  Frenken, 2001). The matrices map technical 
characteristics of activities into service characteristics; they capture the internal structure of the 
firm. For example figure 1a) shows a matrix where each column represents an activity and each 
row gives the Lancasterian service characteristics  C1 -C3 of the final product which they 
influence. The value of each characteristic is the sum of the contribution of all activities (Ii) 
having an influence on it. A single activity may affect one or several output characteristics and 
single output characteristics may be affected by one or several activities. Each activity 
contributes to the competitiveness of the firm. The total performance is calculated as the 
average over the performance contribution of every activity. The single activities are in turn 
assumed to be linked through standardised channels of communication in the spots where there 
are overlaps in the contribution to an output characteristic. One may think of different 
departments of a firm, which are related to each other through a standardised flow of 
information. Hence the matrices in figure 1 are graphical representations of near-decomposable 
systems (e.g.  Simon, 1996): the activities have high interdependence with the output 
characteristics and low (and standardised) interdependence amongst themselves.
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Following Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) radical innovation leads to a new internal structure of 
the firm and new service characteristics. An incremental innovation instead improves the 
service characteristics over time with minor changes in the internal structure of the firm. An 
example of incremental change in service characteristics is the car. Its blueprint has been in 
place for a long time and the basic underlying technological idea has not changed for a hundred 
years. No firm entering the market at a later time needed to invent the basic concept of the car 
from scratch. The central technical characteristics have remained constant over time, while 
much improvement has taken place in its output characteristics such as speed or security.  
 
Some activities will mediate the interaction between other activities and in this way influence 
the output characteristics. These may be viewed as the "core" of the evolving organisation and 
technology of a firm. Figure 1b) provides an example where activity I1’ forms such a core (see 
Frenken, op.cit.). If no such activities would exist then the firm would just be a collection of 
unrelated organisational and technological processes no interacting with each other. Activities 
affecting many output characteristics simultaneously are critical, as a change may affect the 
performance of the firm to a larger extent than activities influencing only one isolated output 
characteristic. They lower the control of the management over the competitiveness of the firm 
because a small change may have large effects. This result has been presented in a genetic 
context by  Altenberg (1995). His simulation study found that lower performance values are 
likely to be associated with activities affecting many output characteristics, because for these 
the probability of having dismal effects on overall performance is higher. At the other extreme, 
an activity affecting only one characteristic is likely to show higher contributions to overall 
performance, as negative changes do not have a pervasive effect and can be identified and 
isolated without affecting other output characteristics. A technology map consisting only of 
such activities is perfectly separable (and modular) and would maximise control of 
management, but it is devoid of a coordination mechanism relating them to each other. Here, it 
would no longer be possible to talk about a firm.  
 
                                                 
2 For a more exhaustive discussion of the generalised NK model and its relation to Kauffman’s model the reader is 
referred to the papers by Frenken (2001, 2002) and Frenken, Marengo and Valente (2002).     5 
 
The existence of highly interrelated activities has two implications on the process of innovation 
and technological search. First, the discussion in the previous paragraph suggests that for core 
activities more trade-offs between the performance values of different functions exist, as the 
probability that the improvements in performance of some functions are offset by reductions in 
performance of other functions is higher. The more complex the process technology, the higher 
is the likelihood that a change in one component may conflict with the overall performance. 
This implies that elements in the "core" are less likely to be changed. Improvements within the 
context of a technological paradigm take place mostly by substituting, adding or changing 
activities that are peripheral, such as inputs I2 and I3 in figure 1 b). The second implication is 
that it represents a stable and profitable set-up and reduces technological uncertainty (Caminati, 
1999). The "core" represents a design of a process technology that works and that can be 
further explored, as the example of the car suggests. Usually there is an incentive to keep the 
"core" elements of the operating techniques as they are. If external shocks punctuate the 
evolutionary equilibrium (e.g. shifts in customer preferences or sudden and persistent rises in 
prices of some inputs) the strong complementarities in the "core" may turn into binding 
constraints by causing imbalances between activities and hindering adaptation. Then firms have 
an incentive to break up the constraint posed by complementarities between the different 
elements of the "core". In this way complementarities become focusing devices f or 
organisational and technical change.  
 
2.2  Problem solving, learning and appropriability 
The competitive position of a firm does not only depend on how well it has adapted its different 
capabilities to a given environment at a given point in time, but also on how well it is able to 
adjust to or bring about changes in the future (see Metcalfe, 1998, p. 86 ff). In terms of the NK 
model presented earlier, adaptability means a firm’s capability of establishing new linkages and 
breaking up existing ones. In a dynamic environment this is an extraordinarily important 
capability. Unpredictable innovation behaviour of competitors requires a high adaptability, i.e. 
the capacity to change the operating rules and routines of the firm.
3 The organisational and 
technological routines of a firm reflect solutions to a given economic coordination problem. As 
such they filter, condense as well as interpret information and enforce guidelines imposed in 
order to achieve a targeted performance (Arrow, 1974). Changes in the environment will be 
perceived when the performance is negatively affected, and the organisation has routines to 
detect such deviations. They indicate a situation where its organisation or its technology is not 
able to perfectly handle the problem. In a complex system, where it is difficult to detect clear 
causalities, this implies a loss of control. In these situations the appropriation of yields from 
economic activity works imperfectly. Loss of control means that existing routines and 
heuristics have a limited capability to handle the problem. Thus there is an incentive to engage 
in an activity of generating routines, which we may conceive as new (mental and procedural) 
models, languages and signals, which are adapted to the new situation. Firms will try to 
generate new rules or adapt existing ones to the new circumstances and to integrate them into 
the texture of rules and heuristics that are not under pressure. If the firm fails in this process, 
this may lead to its exit from the  market. This is not unlikely, as the process of search is 
difficult because it is difficult to detect causalities in complex networks, which is achieved – as 
will be argued - by modularising the activity of production. 
 
2.2.1  Problem decomposition  
An event external to the firm or the failure of an extant routine or heuristic may trigger the 
creation of new rules, if the given system of routines is not able to handle the change. The first 
step in this direction is to gain an understanding of the problem through i ts cognitive 
decomposition into its constituting elements. If this principle is applied on activities of a firm or 
                                                 
3 In this regard concepts like absorptive capacities (see  Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and dynamic 
capabilities ( Teece and Pisano, 1994) have been studied in relation to rules related to innovation and 
organization.      6 
 
larger ensembles of them a complex system is transformed into a modular one. Decomposition 
leads to the break down of a system into its constituting elements leading to an understanding 
and codification of the properties of its single parts and of their laws of interaction. This allows 
the control over its operation to be increased.  
 
Learning and decomposition takes place through the detection of co-variation between changes 
in elements of the system ( Holland et al., 1986, p. 151 ff.). Clear causalities for such co-
variations are to be discovered only if building blocks of the system are identified whose values 
can be computed independently of other elements of the system (Simon and Ando, 1961; 
Iwasaki and Simon, 1994). From these the interactions of subsystems, and their effects on the 
objective function of the firm follow. It is thus a fundamental feature of every problem solving 
process to break a problem down into its constituting elements. This is true for the division of 
labour as well as for the innovation process (von Hippel, 1990;  Nelson  and Nelson, 2002). 
Problem decomposition is a hierarchical process. It is the art of the person engaged in the 
solution of a problem to think about where it is not necessary to search – this is the talent of the 
entrepreneur. It is (cognitively) impossible to find a solution in a set with an infinite number of 
possible outcomes. Co-variation detection and cognitive framing help. Cognitive framing 
groups different consistent behavioural patterns into subsystems. It is straightforward to 
distinguish production activities from administrative ones, or to distinguish activities of 
assembly from activities of moulding product components. It is a first step to make sense out of 
a complex system. It allows identifying subsystems where problems occur. Co-variation 
detection is the cognitive capability to recognise correlated changes in a system. It is most 
accurate for events or event relations that are visible, i.e. for relations where large changes in 
the organisation of work also cause large changes in the performance of the firm, or put in a 
different way, where there is “strong causality” (see Holland et al., 1986, p. 176). If this is the 
case, then it is relatively easy to delimit the problem and start searching for a path towards a 
better solution and new routines through a process of vicarious trial and error (e.g. Campbell, 
1987; Vincenti, 1990; von Hippel and Tyre, 1995). From its very beginning the interaction of 
cognitive framing with the detection of strong causalities will guide entrepreneurs to organise 
the production into an increasingly near-decomposable system. While it is relatively easy to 
develop cognitive frames and structure the firm accordingly, the relations between activities, 
workers and artefacts are more opaque because they are to some extent tacit. As long as an 
activity is not broken down into primitives of movements and actions, causality is not perfectly 
detectable. The recursive application of the subdivision of tasks goes a long way in this 
direction. It permits the framing of single actions into known categories and detecting co-
variation between them. This leads to a better understanding of the relationship between 
different skills, routines and heuristics. 
 
Problem decomposition is the “divide” part of the “divide and rule” heuristic. In this process 
tacitness is reduced and potential appropriability increases due to the increase in codification. 
But “divide” alone helps only to shed light on the sources generating non-separabilities. It is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for “rule”. “Rule” is only possible if new knowledge is 
created and appropriated and used to maximize the objective function of the firm. As it is the 
owner of the means of production who has the right to appropriate the outcomes of economic 
activity in this process, this is where a  transition of intellectual property from the worker to the 
firm takes place. 
 
2.2.2  Recombining codified and tacit knowledge to increase control:  modularity and new 
knowledge 
The process of problem decomposition generates information about the constituting elements 
of a problem and causal linkages between them. It is now possible to generate new procedures 
and routines to improve the performance of a firm. These new routines will reflect a solution to 
violations of the objective function. We move now into the “impera” domain of the “divide and 
rule” heuristic. The generation of new routines results from the recombination of sub-activities 
mostly within, but also between subsystems. Past experiences with problems similar to the one     7 
 
that has triggered search will act as an important starting point for any effort. They provide 
cognitive frames, which allow for the building of analogies and understanding the problem. 
This is a process that cognitive psychologists have called “slippage” (Holyoak and Thagard, 
1992). The model of a well-understood situation is applied to a new problem and deviations are 
analysed. The case study in this paper shows, that the experience American engineers had 
gained in redesigning products to use standardised and interchangeable parts was important 
prior procedural knowledge in the efforts to reorganise the administration. 
 
Wagner and Altenberg (1996) suggest two mechanisms for the differential suppression and re-
grouping of linkages in existing routines. The first is called parcellation and it consists of the 
suppression of interconnections of lower importance between activities influencing the same 
group of characteristics of the product technology. The second is integration where linkages are 
selectively established between previously unrelated parts  - new and old  - of the process 
technology. Both favour the development of a more modular design of the process technology, 
as shown in figure 3. Frenken (2002) applies this to the evolution of modularity in organisation, 
where by modularity we mean an organisation of work in which the complementarities and 
linkages of two activities I1 and I2 fall mainly among sub-processes within one activity and are 
less frequent between them (see Wagner and Altenberg, 1996). This definition clearly overlaps 
with that of a near-decomposable system and stands in partial contrast to the definition of 
modularity used by  Langlois (2002), as he views modularity as (perfect) decomposability 
assuming the redundancy of functionalities. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The economic effects of increased modularity in production are threefold. First, adaptability is 
increased if the linkages between the related parts of the process technology are organised into 
standardised interfaces. It is easier to change sub-elements if their relation is standardised. This 
allows for increased redundancy (and competition) between sub-elements carrying out 
standardised activities linked through each other in standardised channels. This is an important 
characteristic of modularity.  
 
Second, simulation results support this view as they show that in modular technology 
characteristic maps the likelihood of successful improvements increases, as they are less likely 
to be offset by negative feedbacks. Frenken, Marengo and Valente (1999) have shown that 
problem decomposition and the modularisation of a problem over a complex system dominates 
other search strategies in terms of the speed of convergence to higher levels of fitness. This 
underscores the claim that modularity is an important competitive advantage, as it increases the 
long run probability of survival (for a discussion see Simon, 2002).  
 
Aside from achieving faster convergence to higher levels of fitness, modularity also achieves 
another important feature: modularity permits increased control over activities causing 
imbalances. The reason is straightforward: A higher degree of modularity increases the 
separability in production. The regrouping of links between basic work modules or primitives 
of an activity detracts it from the control of the original owner of its tacit elements. This 
process of extraction works in different ways along the lines of parcellation and integration: (1) 
some basic work primitives and their relations may be used to generate technological blueprints 
which will be embodied into new machines, (2) they may become p art of the organisation 
capital of a firm through embodiment into the work-flow design of the organisation, and (3) 
knowledge about linkages and work primitives may be collected and grouped into activities 
coordinating the interaction between basic work modules and thus act as an interface between 
them. Parcellation and integration thus lead to the formation of new activities new machines 
and labour, the formation of coordinating activities and a specific work flow design. As the 
creation of new knowledge always also implies the generation of some new tacit knowledge, it 
is likely that new tacit knowledge on how to operate new machines and how to coordinate new 
activities will generated. It is not possible to predict whether the tacit knowledge extracted will 
exceed the tacit knowledge created on the basis of the present analytical framework. One     8 
 
cannot assert that the tacitness of the whole process has decreased. However, the control and 
appropriability of knowledge in the decomposed activities will have increased. 
 
Figure 1c illustrates the arguments advanced in the previous paragraphs. The matrix in part b) 
shows a system with three activities producing output characteristics C1 to C3. Activities I1’, I2 
and  I3 are all highly interrelated with each other. I1’ is a central activity, as it influences all 
characteristics Ci. A change in any of the sub-activities of I1 will affect I2 and I3 through 
feedbacks. Matrix c) shows a perfectly modular production architecture in which activity I1 in 
matrix b) is decomposed into activities I1’(1)-I1’(3), which are not linked to each other. Activities 
I2 and I3 now have a higher order aggregating and relating them. Improvements in any of the 
activities  I1’(1)-I1’(3) do not influence other parts of the system besides the interface, and the 
interfaces mediate only between two activities. Once this design of the process technology is 
achieved, the system can be gradually improved without risking losing control over the output 
characteristics Ci and thus of the performance of the firm. This process comes to halt when the 
increases in profitability through recombination vanish. Control over activities I2 and I3 gives 
control over and coordinates the single elements of the original activity I1. Information on the 
linkages of the single elements in I1 has passed over to activities I2 and I3, which may be either 
machines carrying this knowledge or coordination activities and organisational routines, which 
are now part of the organisation. Control has been detracted from the original activity I1’ and 
passed on to the coordination activities, which have now gained relative importance in relation 
to the activities I1’(1)-I1’(3), which now can no longer operate without the action of I2 and I3.  In 
the process of creation of these new activities (i.e. work routines and machines) new tacit 
knowledge is also generated, but those people whose activities have been decomposed do not 
necessarily any longer have the right to dispose over it in the production process. If this 
knowledge has been embodied in the organisation or a machine, it passes over to whoever 
exerts the property rights over these entities. If it instead passes over to (possibly different) 
individuals, it increases their relative power within the organisation. 
 
2.3  Appropriability and appropriation  
The exploration and exploitation of a technological paradigm is constrained in several ways. 
Property rights are constraints, as they provide the definition of the objective function of the 
firm and related measures of performance. The latter acts as an information filter to indicate 
deviations from targeted performance values. In case it indicates a loss of control, action is 
taken. This eventually determines the direction of technological search. Problem decomposition 
and recombination is calibrated against the objective function.  In this way, property rights 
constrain and codetermine the process of problem decomposition and searching on the 
technological landscape. 
 
There are several implications resulting from the discussion of the process of problem 
decomposition, co-variation detection and recombination: First, with the degree of codification 
of the knowledge involved in economic and technological activities the degree of its 
appropriability increases (see Saviotti, 1998) along with control over the activities. Second, the 
break-down of productive knowledge in elementary tasks, along with their recombination, 
increases the specialisation of activities and augments the possibility to develop specialised 
machinery because the knowledge acquires blue-print character. We should thus observe an 
increase in the degree of mechanisation of work. Third, it is likely that the organisation of 
production becomes more modular, as the increasing division of labour is accompanied by a re-
grouping of activities, which makes the organisation of a firm more modular and less 
integrated.  
 
Modularity implies that a hierarchical structure emerges, which connects specialised units of 
production and decentralises authority over the execution of tasks. These units are related to 
each other through relatively stable and standardised channels of communication, and together 
these structures embody organisational knowledge. They can be aggregated into organisational 
units of higher order, which may lie inside or outside the firm. The choice of either of these     9 
 
options will depend on its effect on the objective function imposed on the firm by its owners. In 
the case of integration authority is re-centralised and the complex system can be grasped in its 
entirety. In the case of out-sourcing, the market mechanism takes over the task of co-
ordination. In each case, the relative weight of activities of coordination increases at the cost of 
activities of production, from which knowledge is extracted.  
 
 
3  The search for modularity in the transformation of office work, 1880-1930  
By following the path of the labour process literature we use the rise of the white-collar 
working class as a case on which to apply our framework. The advantage of this case is that 
administrative work is a highly interrelated activity. We offer an interpretation of this process 
in accordance with the framework put forward in the preceding section.  
 
3.1  The development of a new information system: the accounting revolution from the 
1870s to the1890s 
The process of developing an efficient cost accounting information system took place in two 
overlapping stages. In the first the inside contracting system was broken up and modern large 
business hierarchies emerged. The second stage saw the transformation of the information 
processing activities themselves as a response to constraints that were generated by the new 
information processing system.  
 
The typical office in the 19
th century up to the late 1870s was virtually untouched by 
technology and consisted of predominantly male workers. Clerical work had the characteristics 
of a craft as the skills were acquired by on-the-job training. ( Cooper and Taylor, 2000; 
Braverman, 1974). Accounting records primarily reflected external market transactions. In 
larger firms forms of inside contracting were the prevalent method of control. The contracting 
of internal craftsmen avoided administrative overheads and acted partly "as a substitute for 
accounting" (Hopper and Armstrong, 1991, p. 415). The manufacturers set their prices on the 
base of their cost information but were not able to intervene directly on their determination, as 
they could not co-ordinate the production process. 
 
The introduction of new production technologies and the increase of the size of the firms 
created the need for new methods of management. The reaction to this need was the Systemic 
Management movement that gained large support in US manufacturing in the late 1870s 
(Litterer, 1963). It "based its reassertion of control and co-ordination on record keeping and 
flows of written information up, down, and across the hierarchy" with the aim to "transcend 
reliance on the individual in favour of dependence on system" and to monitor and evaluate 
performance (Yates, 1989, p. 10-11). Systemic Management represented a set of procedures for 
decomposing activities into elementary work units.
4 A first step to take control of the activities 
on the shop floor was the direct payment of wages and salaries. This led to the demise of the 
inside contracting system, and salaried foremen replaced contractors. The property rights of the 
owners were thereby reasserted and the power of the contractors broken.  
 
The introduction of standard measures of performance for activities and sub-processes led to 
processes of parcellation and integration. Larger production units were broken up into smaller 
ones. Many of the decision tasks taken away from foremen were integrated into new centralised 
staff departments, which acted as an interface activity between the shop floor and the 
management of the firm. This reduced the scope of the foremen’s authority greatly. 
Management gained direct control (through integration) over the activities on the shop floor as 
output requirements were standardised, precise production schedules introduced and 
performance monitored through detailed cost figures. Accounting and its transformation into a 
current cost management technique were instrumental in this process.  
                                                 
4 Scientific Management that was introduced with moderate success towards the end of the 1890s brought these 
principles to its limits (Boorstin, 1973, p. 369).     10 
 
 
The formal bureaucratic structure  was a result of a process of decomposition and re-
composition. But as the information system was set up new constraints became binding for the 
information processing activities themselves, as summarised by the following quote from 
Beninger: 
 
A crisis of control in office technology and bureaucracy in the 1880s, as the growing 
scope, complexity and speed of information processing [...] began to strain the manual 
handling system of large business enterprises. This crisis had begun to ease by the 1890s, 
owing to innovations not only in the processor itself (the bureaucratic structure) but also 
in its information creation or gathering (inputs), in its recording or storage (memory), in 
its formal rules and procedures (programming), and in its processing and communication 
(both internal and as outputs to its environment) (Beniger, 1986, p. 390). 
 
The large business administrations produced and processed information on a large scale. The 
need for qualified clerks and the low potentials for productivity advances made the constraints 
set by the labour market for clerical workers binding in the 1880s. In the three decades from 
1880 to 1910 the share of clerical workers in the total working population increased from 1,1% 
to 5,1%: the number of clerks in the United States rose from 186.000 to 1.8 million.
5 These 
changes in number went hand in hand with the transformation of clerical work and the 
reorganisation of the office.  
 
3.2  Finalising the information system: the mechanisation of the administration from 
the late 1880s to 1930s 
The sheer size of the information processing volume and the labour intense character of the 
clerical activity inflated the bureaucratic structure. On a smaller scale, these circumstances 
resembled the situation that had led to the development of the American System of 
Manufactures four decades before (see Hounshell, 1984). Sources suggest that engineers played 
an important role in restructuring the bureaucratic machinery ( McPherson, 1992). Their 
primary objective was to reduce the dependence of administrative processes on skilled clerical 
labour by making labour and capital good inputs separable. Their training in the tradition of 
American engineering provided the background for approaching this problem. The American 
System of Manufactures may be viewed as a meta-heuristic or problem solving algorithm for 
problems in the production sphere, which they applied to the organisation. The model was the 
system of modular production based on standardised parts and activities. The division of labour 
in administrative work thereby increased through the standardisation of tasks, data and 
information channels. In parallel, those activities for which this was possible were mechanised. 
The standardisation of data and tasks was an important precondition for the introduction of 
office machines, as they could unfold their full productivity potential only if a smooth flow of 
standardised and indexed information was available.  
 
The role of parcellation and integration in this process becomes clear for the development of 
bookkeeping practices. Bookkeeping was sliced into a sequence of distinct and specialised 
occupations. A first step was to separate data handling, amenable to standardisation, from data 
analysis, which was not. Through this, the dichotomy of bookkeeping and accounting emerged. 
Bookkeeping activities were divided into activities of work preparation and activities of data 
manipulation. Work preparation tasks, such as t he sorting of vouchers and receipts and the 
examination of related ledgers, were executed without mechanical aides, but reached a high 
degree of specialisation in manpower. In most cases one clerk was responsible for some subset 
of tasks with respect to one narrow subclass of accounts. Adding machines, calculators, 
bookkeeping and billing machines or even Hollerith systems were adopted. The organisation of 
                                                 
5 Compiled form J.M. Hooks Woman's Occupations through seven decades US Department of labour 
1947 and Historical Statistics, Abstracts of the US Series D57-71 Later: US Bureau of Census (1972). 
For details see Hölzl and Reinstaller (2000, p 8).     11 
 
the accounting activities was turned into a modular system, as changes in one sub-activity were 
made i ndependently from changes in other sub-activities. The increased division of labour re-
classified clerical work into standardised and quasi-standardised activities.  
 
The re-organisation of administrative work and the invention and development of supporting 
mechanical devices was a co-evolutionary process. Most information processing devices were 
invented and introduced on the market in the years between 1870 and 1890 (1873: typewriters, 
1879: cash registers, 1885: calculators, 1889: Hollerith system, etc.). The key requirements of 
the new office machinery were summarised by Leffingwell and Robinson (1950, p. 282-3): To 
save labour, to save time, to promote accuracy and to relieve monotony.
6 One could add "in 
order to achieve an order of magnitude jump in office work productivity". The critical skills 
needed to perform quantitative or repetitive operations such as sorting or adding were 
embodied in some mechanism, and the machines could be operated without much previous 
training. For more knowledge intensive activities, such as typing and short hand taking in many 
cases an embodiment was not possible. Office machines were instead used to support the 
specialisation of labour. A strong complementarity between the new technological artefact and 
the operator was the result, but the standardisation of the user-interface, like the typewriter 
keyboard, also forced the standardisation of skills, and the separability of the process from tacit 
knowledge or skills specific to a single worker. 
 
Typewriters were the first technology of the new office work regime. Their domains of 
application were all activities involving the distribution of information on small scale. The 
typewriter as a technical artefact was an innovation but did not in itself represent a productivity 
increasing technical advance. Its mechanical construction did not embody any specific clerical 
knowledge or skill so that its use did not automatically lead to a productivity increase. The 
standardised human-machine interface was the crucial c riterion for its adoption. The (quite 
special) interaction of service requirements and technological characteristics that gave birth to 
the QWERTY keyboard is well known (David,  1985). The subsequent development of touch-
typing played a c rucial role in making the typewriter a viable technology for business 
administrations, as it contributed to producing a homogeneous labour supply. The co-existence 
of different keyboards with different practices would have lead to a segmentation of the labour 
market with an inevitably lower elasticity of supply. As typewriters were fixed capital firms 
organised their operations in such a way as to increase the rate of utilisation. This led to 
centralised services for typing, and to functional office departments, which pooled typing 
activities ( Leffingwell and Robinson, 1950, p. 34). Typing became a profession and an 
administrative process in its own right. The typist had a clearly defined activity profile, which 
consisted of taking (shorthand-) notes and writing them on paper with the machine using a 
particular typing method. Standards of practice were attained by the standardisation of letter 
styles and forms, thereby influencing the way business correspondence was done (Leffingwell 
and Robinson, 1950, p. 143 ff.). Typing pools were formed through the integration of new 
activities into the administration.  
 
As the large administrative organisations owed their very existence to the need to gather and 
evaluate quantitative data, the capability to perform simple mathematical operations was of 
foremost importance. Adding and calculating machines were general-purpose tools applicable 
to a vast range of uses. They embodied the most important skills of a good bookkeeper: quick 
and reliable computing. The locus of the labour saving potential was primarily the mechanical 
arithmetic unit and was independent of the skills of the machine operator. Operators could learn 
quite quickly to handle them, but did not need to know much mathematics. They did not even 
need how to know a specific standardised method of use such as touch-typing (see table 1). 
Bookkeeping machines evolved out of other office appliances and entered the market only in 
the 1920s. In most cases they were tailored to specific uses and were essentially made by 
combining adding machines with typewriters or normal adding machines with mechanisms 
allowing special carriage movements.  
                                                 
6 These are the headings to sections on machine use in office work.     12 
 
 
Hollerith machines or tabulating gear differed from the previous technologies. They were 
instrumental for the implementation of new organisational designs. This becomes clear if we 
consider that, to sell such devices, “a salesmen had not to sell the machine but the organisation” 
(Pirker, 1962, p. 79). Salesmen, who typically were trained engineers, acted as technical 
advisors as well as organisation designers. Organisational concepts developed for businesses in 
one particular sector were then used as blueprints for other firms in that sector. Tabulating gear 
was used to process company wide data on a large scale. Large business firms tabulating gear 
for sales statistics, payroll and inventory management, and later for consumer trend analyses.  
 
A tabulating system consisted of punched cards (the media on which operating instructions and 
information were stored), cardpunch machines to transfer the information on the cards, sorting 
machines and a tabulator to count the sorted cards. This made them very flexible, as they could 
be re-programmed. The operation of tabulating machines was split into three distinct activities: 
(1) the codification of sorting and tabulating routines, (2) the codification of the information 
and (3) the evaluation itself, i.e. the actual sorting and tabulating of information. Accounting 
and organisation specialists carried out the codification of routines. Specific sorting and 
tabulating processes were stored on punched cards and could be used when necessary. The 
programming of routines and routine sequences was an activity that happened only sporadically 
at the set up of the machine and subsequent organisational changes. These programs made 
codified procedural knowledge on clerical operations readily available. Hollerith and Powers 
systems isolated productivity increases in data processing from the skills of the manpower 
almost completely.
7 The high specialisation and division of labour typical for the shop floor in 
the American System found its correspondence in a number of new occupations. Pirker (1962, 
p. 95) noted in regard to the organisation of work “for the first time something appears in the 
office, that can be compared to the working practice on the shop floor”. Keypunch operators 
codified and controlled the information; sorters were responsible for the supervision of sorting 
and tabulating p rocesses; lead-machine operators (also called tabulators) were responsible for 
the wiring of the control panels and the verification of the machines and programmers finally 
were responsible for programming and designing process flows. The skill requirements 
increased in ascending order: the skill requirements for key-punch operators and sorters was 
completion of primary school, tabulators needed to have specific technical skills and therefore 
mostly held secondary school degrees. The programmers were university graduates in 
mathematics or engineering, were seen as professional organisers and operated in a middle 
management environment (see table 1). In comparison to the other professions, only 
programmers were in short supply, but only a few were needed. 
 
 
4  Discussion  
Our case study provides some evidence for the theoretical arguments advanced in this paper. 
The change in the property rights regime, from an early capitalistic to the organised capitalistic 
form, triggered a reconfiguration of administrative processes in the US industry. The cognitive 
model guiding the generation of new routines and tasks was the organisation of the shop floor. 
The process of decomposition and regrouping of tasks through parcellation and integration led 
to a more modular design  of the administrative hierarchy. New machines, which supported 
information processing, reduced the dependence on skilled clerical work. The number of 
activities in the realm of the business administration grew and became more specialised, 
reflecting the more modular organisational design. The outcome of this process can be 
summarised by the following observations on the design of the new activities and the related 
technologies: 
 
                                                 
7 Exceptions were keypunches. Their efficient operation relied on the speed with which the codification could take 
place. In first place this led either to the adoption of the typewriter keyboard (for alphanumerical insertions) or a 10-
key keyboard (for purely numerical insertions) with the keys ordered in four rows. Both allowed using touch-typing 
methods. As the codification of data continued to be the bottleneck in this technology, the use of standardised 
interfaces was important.     13 
 
a)  In the case where perfect codification was possible and the critical knowledge could be 
embodied in machinery, the skill requirements (or labour requirements) was reduced. An 
example is the calculator, where the critical productivity-enhancing factor , i.e. calculating, 
was embodied in capital. 
b)  When codification was only partially possible this led to a partial deskilling. Bookkeeping 
machines made it possible to separate the manual bookkeeping activities from more 
conceptual accounting process. Routine activity was standardised and facilitated by 
bookkeeping machines. The correct handling sequence of bills and their booking were 
embodied in the organisation of the labour flow. Finally, activities of evaluation of 
accounts and coordination were concentrated into the hands of few highly qualified 
accountants. The control over the activity of accounting was concentrated there.  
c)  When codification was not possible, capital goods appeared that supported the 
standardisation of the work process. The typewriter provides an example for this. The 
standardisation of the work process was realised b y the standardisation of the interface 
between man and machine, lead to the emergence of standardised skills in typing. Control 
over the activity „writing“ was increased by both the possibility of monitoring the 
performance of workers, and the standardisation of skills, which permitted increasing the 
supply of labour by fostering typing education.  
 
However, decomposition and mechanisation are only one part of the story. The integration of 
processes into new business processes (organisational capital) is best illustrated by the example 
of tabulating gear. The introduction of tabulating gear embodying the bookkeeping activity led 
to the set up of new activities in an organisational set-up that fed the machines. The new 
knowledge was largely embodied in organisation programmers and software engineers. A new 
class of accountants, which coordinated activities on the basis of the results of the bookkeeping 
process, emerged. The history of tabulating gear shows that new processes were integrated in 
the new organisational machinery, and how office work was transformed by new tasks, 
activities, routines and interface activities. The case study presents the division of labour as a 
process of codification of knowledge, embodiment of knowledge in machinery and generation 
of new activities, routines and knowledge. The case shows clearly that in this process the 
control and power distribution in the governance of the enterprise changed towards the 
management and owners of capital.  
 
Our study also supports the view that codification and knowledge creation, and the 
organisational set-up of a firm, are not neutral with respect to property rights. Property rights 
shape the identification of complementarity constraints and the adoption of solutions, as 
property rights in physical capital are well protected while expropriation of human capital is 
hard to protect. In the last one hundred years we have seen that critical knowledge was replaced 
by more and more sophisticated physical capital, standardised procedures and tasks. Some 
commentators (e.g. Zingales, 2000) claim that the strategy of replacing human capital with 
physical capital becomes less and less important. Our study suggests that this is only the case 
when tacit knowledge is too complex to be codified.   
 
It is frequently contended that today human capital is the crucial asset for a firm’s success. The 
question if this is indeed the case depends on whether a tacit crucial asset can be extracted from 
its holder. Rajan and Zingales (2000) present the case of the advertising agency Saatchi and 
Saatchi as an illustration of the claim that personal human capital is the most important asset in 
the enterprise of the knowledge economy: When shareholders, led by U.S. fund mangers, voted 
down a generous option package of Maurice Saatchi because they wanted to punish managerial 
self-interest, this led to the departure of Maurice Saatchi, followed by the resignation of several 
key executives. Together they formed the new advertising agency M and C Saatchi that in a 
short period of time captured some of the key customers of the original firm, which was 
severely damaged. This underscores a key argument of this study: the critical assets of an 
advertising agency are typically the personal contacts key employees have developed with 
customers. These are assets that are not codifiable. It would be straightforward to conclude 
from this that in an increasingly knowledge intense and service-oriented economy the relative     14 
 
power in a firm will shift from the owners to key-employees. But in light of our study, this 
view is likely to be misleading. An example contradicting this perspective is the recent attempt 
to introduce business-to-business contracting through the Internet. The creation of specialised 
marketplaces for intermediate products leads to a reduction of the personal (human) content in 
customer relations. This weakens the relative position of the sales force, whose tacit skills are 
replaced by standardised relations and “intelligent” sales databases on the computerised market 
place. Another example is case-tools used for computer programming purposes. Case tools 
support structured programming. For this purpose they also include automatic documentation 
generation mechanism and interface management tools supporting the interaction between 
different sub-modules of the code, which are handled by different individuals or groups of 
programmers. Case tools  rationalise programming and increase the programmers’ productivity, 
but they also weaken the power of programmers, as the standardised documentation procedures 
weaken their tacit knowledge on the code they have produced and support a more modular 
development design. In this sense, programmers are easier to replace when case tools are used.  
 
The cases of business to business contracting and case t ools show that the mechanisms 
analysed and described in this paper are also at work in knowledge-intensive environments. 
The more important the critical assets which cannot be codified and embodied into capital 
goods or organisational routines, as in the S aatchi case, the more power is located in the 
individual agents who hold this knowledge. However, if codification is possible, tools 
supporting centralised control and modularisation will be introduced. Thus, there is a dialectic 
tension between the creation of new knowledge and codification, as contended by   Nonaka 




5  Conclusion 
In this paper we have advanced an analysis of the division of labour by means of a complex 
systems approach. The complex systems perspective allows us to draw conclusions on the 
design of organisations and of technologies supporting the modularisation of activities. We 
assert that the Babbage principle consists of two distinct steps, the processes of problem 
decomposition and re-composition. The first has its roots in general cognitive principles 
applied to problem solving, and the latter is a manifestation of the property rights regime. 
Property rights play an important role as focussing device in the identification of 
inconsistencies in organisation and production in that they define the objective function of a 
firm. Deviations from the latter guide the direction of the innovation process. Identified 
problems in production are split up into sub-problems and after solving those the work process 
is re-composed giving rise to a more modular design of the organisation and technology of a 
firm. In this way the control of management over the production process increases. The new 
organisational forms and technologies adopted will support the codification of knowledge and 
its embodiment into capital goods or organisational processes.  
 
Property rights and the limits to the codification of knowledge are identified as the most 
important forces shaping the process of organisational and technological change. We draw 
implications for corporate governance and the governance of the innovation process from our 
analysis and case study. The process of modularisation of the organisation of the firm removes 
knowledge and control from the lower layers of the hierarchy and concentrates it on higher 
levels. The governance of the innovation process is driven by the struggle for control over 
crucial assets, such as specific skills or knowledge. This is constrained by the codifiability of 
the underlying knowledge. If the knowledge is very complex and hence very costly to codify, 
the power balance between the capital and labour holding those crucial knowledge changes in 
favour of the latter. Some authors have argued that this is the case in the ”knowledge-based 
economy”. Our conclusion is that these studies have probably gone too far. They neglect that 
the loss of control over production violates the profit-making objective of a firm set out in the 
capitalistic property rights regime. This acts as a very powerful focusing device for innovative 





Figure 1: a) The NK model (N=3 K=1) of figure 1 b)  in a generalised representation. b) A generalised,  non-modular NK 
model  with activities I2 and I3  as core and I1’ as general and highly interdependent activity.  c) Decomposed version of b) 




Figure 2: The effects of parcellation and integration in the redesign of the process technology. Adapted from Wagner and  
Altenberg (1996). 
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Table 1: Early information technology: innovation characteristics of the most important technologies of the IT Regime 
User side  Technology 
(i)Supported economic function of 
organisation and (ii) type of pro-cessed 
information 
(i) Source of productivity gains and (ii) 
effect on established competences, i.e. 
clerical work before IT Regime  
New professions  Required skills 
Typewriter  (i) Co-ordination  
 
(ii) Multiplying codifying of qualitative 
information 
(i) User interface, touch typing and comple-
mentary technologies 
 
(ii) Replacement of copyists 
Typist; establishment of typing pools.  Touch-typing (about 60 words a minute), 
shorthand writing at least 60-75 words a 
minute  (partly replaced by Dictaphones), 
good language and grammar skills, letter 
writing ability. High school degree preferred. 




(i) Monitoring  
 
 
(ii) Processing of quantitative (accounting) 
data 
(i) Mechanical adding or calculating 
mechanism, automatic entry controls, user 
interface 
 
(ii) Replacement of mathematical skills;   
In large enterprises Comptometer or adding 
machine operators; used in functionalised 
bookkeeping, sales or billing departments 
also on sporadic base. Establishment of 
computation pools. 
Machine use. Touch-typing. Training period: 
few days. Girls of about 17 years of age with 
two years in secondary school. 
Accounting 
machines 
(i) Monitoring and allocation  
 
 
(ii) Processing of quantitative accounting 
data 
(i) As for adding machines plus reduction of 
double entry mistakes through better work 
preparation 
 
(ii) Replacement of book-keepers (mathema-
tical skills, book-keeping skills) 
None; used in functionalised bookkeeping 
departments which took also the form of 
bookkeeping pools. 
Machine use. Training period: accounting 
clerks with double-entry skills two weeks. 
Hollerith  – 
Powers systems  
(i) Monitoring and allocation  
 
 
(ii) Processing of quantitative (accounting) 
data 
(i) Electric contact principle, codification of 





(ii) Replacement of mathematical and 





Establishment of card punch units, and 
machine rooms. 
Puncher: in some cases typing skills mostly 
not; primary school degree. No further skills 
needed. Training period: 1-4 month   
Sorter: No special skills, but strong physical 
constitution required; primary school degree. 
Training period: about 6 month. 
Tabulator: secondary school degree and 
technical skills. Training period: 1,5 to 2 
years.  
Programmer: organisational skills, business 
skills;  preferably university degree in 
mathematics or a technical discipline. 
Training period: 4 years. 
Source: Hölzl and Reinstaller (2000) 
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